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Perhaps I’d be more apt to believe in it if one or more of those reformer candidates was advocating popular uprising against the Supreme Leader, aka the Ayatollah who actually makes all the real meaningful decisions in the Iranian government.

Like it is with most all modern asian governments, “democracies” included, real structural change will only come when the military turns against strong man or the oligarchy. The Shia religious element is something to take into account with Iran as well — crushed in on western and eastern borders by heavily armed volatile Sunni-majority nations — but I still think the central tenet of asian governance holds firm: political authority is predicated through the implicit or explicit threat of violent force.

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I’ve always been torn on Rousseau and Locke. The social contract is a noble concept, probably one of the noblest, but even the most cursory glance at current events and back at history will make it plain that natural rights are a sham. Nation states and the contract of rights they grant and/or deny to their citizenry are based on a foundation of violence either explicit or implicit, directed toward its own citizens or outwards towards perceived foreign enemies.

One of my favorite examples is Turkey’s republican democracy: it’s marked with multiple occasions on which the military, whose command structure is largely staffed with scions of Turkey’s highly educated, secular intellectual class, has directly intervened in elections to depose presidents with Islamic fundamentalist leanings. They do this on the claim that key to Turkey’s constitution is a section forever establishing the republic as a secular state. Are the rights of the citizenry–the right to govern themselves, being violated by their military? I would say yes, but not condemn the act. After all, they are violating the democracy in order to depose people who would more than likely erode the democracy much more dramatically had they been left in office.

The firewall between the military and politics is largely a Western, First-World conceit. Imagine if the U.S. military weighed into elections to depose any religious fundamentalists who happened to make it into office.

This is all pure speculation.

If most Western liberal democracies have taken the view of von Clausewitz that wars are an extension of politics, rendering a military’s commanders subordinates to the civilian government, and that total war is an untenable military or political posture, then does that not render a conversion to full-on libertarian, Athenian direct democracy a geopolitical impossibility (short of majority-mandated nuclear hellfire)?

Of course, the libertarian response, and it’s as good one, would be that nation states would play a much smaller part in each others’ domestic affairs than they do now. But still assuming there has been a full return to direct democracy (my conceit here is the assumption that the advancement of libertarian ideals would involve the overhaul of representative democracy/republicanism), then I highly doubt that there would be no highly influential, highly populous voting demographics in the U.S., much less any other nuclear-equipped nation, that won’t harbor a knee-jerk, button-press approach to foreign affairs. In that sense, libertarianism then faces the same problem Marxist-Leninism did: the justification that communism cannot work unless the entire world is communist.

Republican Spain had a democratic army. George Orwell in Homage to Catalonia speaks of it positively, primarily for the fact that it worked as well as it did, but of course we all know how well it panned out for Republican Spain.

This is all pure speculation.

“Periods of transition are always periods of mismanagement; thus the predominant demand of the time was for efficiency. Acutely conscious of the prevailing insecurity, that small section of the populace which exercised its influence was in general prepared to accept any government which could guarantee peace and order.”

“Few men are so disinterested as to prefer to live in discomfort under a government which they hold to be right rather than live in comfort under one which they hold to be wrong.”

– C.V. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War (pg. 19)

In the past two or three years I’ve grown increasingly skeptical– or simply cautious– of the distinctly modern worldview that views liberal democracy as the best recourse for effective governance the world over. Of course, this was a keystone in the now largely defunct Neoconservative philosophy for foreign affairs, but in another way it seems to have become part of the First World Left’s philosophy (only as much as the First World Left can be said to have a coherent philosophy, which is mostly does not anymore) as well.

The usual example cited in your run-of-the-mill Tyranny of the Majority criticisms of democratic systems is the one of the Nazi Party being democratically elected to office. The important part to remember about the Nazis’ ascension is that the citizenry of Germany had been suffering under the ineptitude and crippled nature of the Weimar Republic ever since the end of the First World War. To say they hungered for efficiency is most likely an understatement– and of course the Nazis marketed themselves as “National Socialists,” socialism being the Platonic image of efficient governance at the time (Market liberalism was not exactly in the hottest of states in the 1930s, was it?) Of course, I am not condoning the Nazi Party or any of their philosophies, but simply look at it from a Machiavellian viewpoint (something more intelligent people should be doing about more issues more often): For much of the 1930s provided one fit the ethnic, social and political criteria for Nazi affiliation, life in Germany was relatively good.

In Turkey, multiple presidents have been deposed by a largely independent military for attempting to betray the constitution of the Turkish state, in particular the clause establishing secular rule. As journalist and author Robert Kaplan describes in his book Eastward to Tartary, the majority of commissioned officers in the Turkish military are progeny of an established intellectual class: committed to democratic ideals, but even more committed to the preservation of secularism. And a majority of Turks support these somewhat systematic coup de’tat moves. Really, can you blame them? I’ve found that I cannot. After all, we’ve seen the effectiveness of theocracies in providing their subjects a stable, prosperous quality of life in the Taiping Rebellion and the reign of the Taliban in Afghanistan, not to mention most all of Mesopotamia’s history since Hulagu Khan’s sacking of Baghdad in the 13th Century.

After all, aren’t all governments founded on violence either explicit or implicit? Social contracts are well and good, and I don’t say that sarcastically, but look at it practically: what is a law in its rawest form other than a promise of implied violence attached to a self-evident moral code of culture in which it is established? Again, that’s not to say that laws are ludicrous– I’m more or less through with anarchism– but is it not important to attempt to see things as they really are? (“Reality” is the providence of journalists, “truth” that of philosophers)

There are already books out that imply that the system which governs a polity is more attached to that state’s cultural and physical geography more than impersonal international political philosophies (Neo-Marxists are you listening?) With things going the way they are, I figure more books are on the way.

This is all pure speculation.